aireplay-ng is used to inject/replay frames. The primary function is
to generate traffic for the later use in aircrack-ng for cracking the
WEP and WPA-PSK keys. There are different attacks which can cause deau‐
thentications for the purpose of capturing WPA handshake data, fake au‐
thentications, Interactive packet replay, hand-crafted ARP request in‐
jection and ARP-request reinjection. With the packetforge-ng tool it's
possible to create arbitrary frames.
aireplay-ng supports single-NIC injection/monitor.
This feature needs driver patching.
Shows the help screen.
MAC address of access point.
MAC address of destination.
MAC address of source.
Minimum packet length.
Maximum packet length.
Frame control, type field.
Frame control, subtype field.
Frame control, "To" DS bit (0 or 1).
Frame control, "From" DS bit (0 or 1).
Frame control, WEP bit (0 or 1).
-D Disable AP Detection.
Number of packets per second.
Set frame control word (hex).
Set Access Point MAC address.
Set destination MAC address.
Set source MAC address.
Change ring buffer size (default: 8 packets). The minimum is 1.
-F Choose first matching packet.
Fake Authentication attack: Set target SSID (see below). For
SSID containing special characters, see https://www.aircrack-
Fake Authentication attack: Set the number of packets for every
authentication and association attempt (Default: 1). 0 means
Fake Authentication attack: Set the time between keep-alive
packets in fake authentication mode.
-Q Fake Authentication attack: Sends reassociation requests instead
of performing a complete authentication and association after
each delay period.
Fake Authentication attack: Specifies the keystream file for
fake shared key authentication.
-T n Fake Authentication attack: Exit if fake authentication fails
-j ARP Replay attack : inject FromDS packets (see below).
Fragmentation attack: Set destination IP in fragments.
Fragmentation attack: Set source IP in fragments.
-B Test option: bitrate test.
Capture packets from this interface.
Extract packets from this pcap file.
-R disable /dev/rtc usage.
--ignore-negative-one if the interface's channel can't be determined
ignore the mismatch, needed for unpatched cfg80211
--deauth-rc , -Z Provide a reason code when doing deauthica‐
tion (between 0 and 255). By default, 7 is used: Class 3 frame received
from unassociated STA. 0 is a reserved value. Reason codes explanations
can be found in the IEEE802.11 standard or in https://mrnc‐
-0 , --deauth=
This attack sends deauthentication packets to one or more
clients which are currently associated with a particular access
point. Deauthenticating clients can be done for a number of rea‐
sons: Recovering a hidden ESSID. This is an ESSID which is not
being broadcast. Another term for this is "cloaked" or Capturing
WPA/WPA2 handshakes by forcing clients to reauthenticate or Gen‐
erate ARP requests (Windows clients sometimes flush their ARP
cache when disconnected). Of course, this attack is totally
useless if there are no associated wireless client or on fake
-1 , --fakeauth=
The fake authentication attack allows you to perform the two
types of WEP authentication (Open System and Shared Key) plus
associate with the access point (AP). This is only useful when
you need an associated MAC address in various aireplay-ng at‐
tacks and there is currently no associated client. It should be
noted that the fake authentication attack does NOT generate any
ARP packets. Fake authentication cannot be used to authenti‐
cate/associate with WPA/WPA2 Access Points.
This attack allows you to choose a specific packet for replaying
(injecting). The attack can obtain packets to replay from two
sources. The first being a live flow of packets from your wire‐
less card. The second being from a pcap file. Reading from a
file is an often overlooked feature of aireplay-ng. This allows
you read packets from other capture sessions or quite often,
various attacks generate pcap files for easy reuse. A common use
of reading a file containing a packet your created with packet‐
The classic ARP request replay attack is the most effective way
to generate new initialization vectors (IVs), and works very re‐
liably. The program listens for an ARP packet then retransmits
it back to the access point. This, in turn, causes the access
point to repeat the ARP packet with a new IV. The program re‐
transmits the same ARP packet over and over. However, each ARP
packet repeated by the access point has a new IVs. It is all
these new IVs which allow you to determine the WEP key.
This attack, when successful, can decrypt a WEP data packet
without knowing the key. It can even work against dynamic WEP.
This attack does not recover the WEP key itself, but merely re‐
veals the plaintext. However, some access points are not vulner‐
able to this attack. Some may seem vulnerable at first but actu‐
ally drop data packets shorter that 60 bytes. If the access
point drops packets shorter than 42 bytes, aireplay tries to
guess the rest of the missing data, as far as the headers are
predictable. If an IP packet is captured, it additionally checks
if the checksum of the header is correct after guessing the
missing parts of it. This attack requires at least one WEP data
This attack, when successful, can obtain 1500 bytes of PRGA
(pseudo random generation algorithm). This attack does not re‐
cover the WEP key itself, but merely obtains the PRGA. The PRGA
can then be used to generate packets with packetforge-ng which
are in turn used for various injection attacks. It requires at
least one data packet to be received from the access point in
order to initiate the attack.
In general, for an attack to work, the attacker has to be in the
range of an AP and a connected client (fake or real). Caffe
Latte attacks allows one to gather enough packets to crack a WEP
key without the need of an AP, it just need a client to be in
This attack turns IP or ARP packets from a client into ARP re‐
quest against the client. This attack works especially well
against ad-hoc networks. As well it can be used against softAP
clients and normal AP clients.
This attack works against Cisco Aironet access points configured
in WPA Migration Mode, which enables both WPA and WEP clients to
associate to an access point using the same Service Set Identi‐
fier (SSID). The program listens for a WEP-encapsulated broad‐
cast ARP packet, bitflips it to make it into an ARP coming from
the attacker's MAC address and retransmits it to the access
point. This, in turn, causes the access point to repeat the ARP
packet with a new IV and also to forward the ARP reply to the
attacker with a new IV. The program retransmits the same ARP
packet over and over. However, each ARP packet repeated by the
access point has a new IV as does the ARP reply forwarded to the
attacker by the access point. It is all these new IVs which al‐
low you to determine the WEP key.
Tests injection and quality.
- Can obtain the full packet length of 1500 bytes XOR. This
means you can subsequently pretty well create any size of
- May work where chopchop does not
- Is extremely fast. It yields the XOR stream extremely quickly
- Setup to execute the attack is more subject to the device
drivers. For example, Atheros does not generate the correct
packets unless the wireless card is set to the mac address you
- You need to be physically closer to the access point since if
any packets are lost then the attack fails.
- May work where frag does not work.
- Cannot be used against every access point.
- The maximum XOR bits is limited to the length of the packet
you chopchop against.
- Much slower then the fragmentation attack.
This manual page was written by Adam Cecile for
the Debian system (but may be used by others). Permission is granted
to copy, distribute and/or modify this document under the terms of the
GNU General Public License, Version 2 or any later version published by
the Free Software Foundation On Debian systems, the complete text of
the GNU General Public License can be found in /usr/share/common-li‐